THINKING ABOUT THE CEASEFIRE :How Much Longer Do We Have?
A ceasefire between Israel and the Hamas government of the Gaza Strip went into effect on 19 June, 2008. This kind of ceasefire is called a tahadiya in Arabic, and it contrasts with a hudna, which is another kind of ceasefire having different implications and other time-limits. That there are two flavors of ceasefire is not accidental, but rather legally stipulated in Sharia, which is the Moslem legal system. They are based on arrangements Mohammad and the other early Moslems made with the tribes with whom that first Islamic generation fought.
Moslem terrorists of today identify with the old jihad warriors of centuries ago. They view themselves as continuing those wars against modern enemies. During the early wars of conquest, when the Moslems first defeated all the non-Moslem tribes to conquer the whole Arabian peninsula, and then burst out to conquer much of the Mediterranean world, as well as the whole Middle East, thus imposing themselves on the nationalities between Morocco and India, the conquerors frequently made temporary ceasefire agreements with those they were about to conquer.
The Hudna kind of ceasefire is an agreement to be entered upon with an enemy for a period of ten years. It is signed and settled between the two parties. A tahadiyya, in contrast, can be for any period, and it is a much less formal agreement. The Arabic word “tahadiyya” is the ordinary word for calming. It means that both sides agree not to shoot for a while. It might be for a specified period, but it might be that the Moslems simply state that they will not be shooting “until the next time”, and that there should be peace and quiet for a while.
The Moslem side agreed to a ceasefire in ancient times when they felt they could benefit from having one, and that by a cessation of hostilities their forces would be able to come back stronger than they had been. The Moslems made peace in order to make war.
The present tahadiyya of 19 June, 2008, was agreed upon for six months. During this time, a number of kassam rockets have been fired at Sderot and other Israeli communities near the border with Gaza, but things have indeed been quieter down here than they have been for several years.
Hamas agreed to the ceasefire because the leadership thought it was for the benefit of Hamas to cease its fire against Israel for at least some period of time. The benefits Hamas appears to have reaped from the present calming are several.
Hamas having agreed to the ceasefire, it can use the ceasefire as an excuse to take control of the other militias and terrorist groups in Gaza . Hamas gives itself a license to control, if not to smash, Islamic Jihad and the other smaller terror groups in Gaza . Israel of course wants the ceasefire to continue, and so Israel is in effect blessing the Hamas terrorists’ continuing conquest of Gaza and its domination over the other terror groups there.
Hamas thus takes on more and more of the functions of a state, which is what they want to be, even as they aspire to take over the whole of the West Bank and end the Abbas government there. Israel gains too, at least in the short term, because Hamas now becomes the sole address, and it can be held responsible for keeping quiet on the other side. The long-term consequences of doing deals with creatures like Hamas might be less beneficial to Israel. The tahadiyya does help Israel at least somewhat and for the short term, though, because Israel need not attack Gaza constantly and lose soldiers there.
In domestic politics, Hamas is able to present itself to the Arabs living in Gaza as having forced Israel into a ceasefire with it – something the PA was not able to do in Gaza . It makes Hamas look strong and important – “We are the guys with whom the big boys and Israel must negotiate.” A ceasefire with Hamas makes a shlemiel like Mahmoud Abbas look like a shlemiel.
Hamas further benefits from the ceasefire by being able to build itself up militarily. By refraining from firing rockets at Israel for this half year, Hamas has immensely increased its stockpiles of these rockets and other weapons to use against Israel in the future. These things, or at least their raw material, are mostly smuggled in through tunnels dug under the border with Egypt . It is thought that the first days after the ceasefire will see many, many rockets fired at Israeli civilian targets. These rockets are much heavier and have longer ranges than the kassams do. Hamas will be able to hit not only Sderot, but also Ashkelon , Kryat Gat, and much of the southern part of the country. Hamas’s aim is to make all of Israel into one big Sderot. As the Moslems did during their first wars of conquest, so they do also today: they make peace now in order to make war later.
It is very important to understand that even if the Arabs are not firing rockets at Israel for a period, they still have a large part of the advantage of firing those rockets at Israel , because the terror of anticipating the rocket that might fall five minutes from now remains in the heart of everyone living in Sderot. We all know that the Moslems still have those rockets, that they have used them often enough on us in the past, that Israel ’s armed forces have not destroyed the Arab capacity to make war on us, and that it can all start again. For Hamas , a ceasefire is rather like shooting and not shooting at the same time. This little ceasefire improves the lives of children in Sderot somewhat, but every child knows the rockets can return at any moment. The psychology of being shot at remains.
The six month tahadiyya will end on 19 December of this year. People are nervous about that date. Nobody knows what will happen then. It is possible that Hamas and Israel will sign an extension for another half year, but Hamas might feel ready to take Israel on again. Other observers view Hamas’s larger interest during this period as undermining Abbas and his people. Abbas can be the appetizer; Israel, the main course, will be served later.
Another important date will come in January, when Abbas’s term as president of the PA ends. Abbas appears to want to extend his term indefinitely. Hamas contends – correctly, under the PA constitution – that Abbas will have to step down, and that the speaker of the Palestinian legislative body will become president. That man is from Hamas. This mess has the potential for civil war among the Arabs. If Israel decides to support Abbas against Hamas, in accordance with Israel ’s general policy of helping the side it views as more moderate, Hamas might start shooting at Israel again, and the rockets will return to Sderot.
The third possible scenario for the end of the tahadiyya is the eventuality of Israel’s taking out the Iranian nuclear missile industry. Both Syria and Hamas are allied to, and substantially dependent on, Iran . If there is war between Israel and Iran, Hamas might well enter that war. Hamas might also not; they would be risking everything they have built up if they attacked Israel at that time.
The fourth possible date for the end of the ceasefire is all the other dates, hours, minutes, and seconds between this moment and the end of the world. The Arabs might start shooting at Israel again at any time. Everybody in Sderot lives with that possibility, and people know that the pleasure they take in walking around in public parks again during this ceasefire can end with a sudden bang.
